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The Middle-Income Trap : Some Asian Experiences and Lessons 
 
Shalendrd D. Shdrma 
University of San Francisco 
 
Abstract 
What explains why only a handful of countries which have attained middle-income level have subsequently 
been successful in attaining income convergence with high-income countries, while most of their peers falter? 
The problem most face has been labelled as the "Middle-Income Trap." How, precisely, does the trap impact 
once-promising economies, and can China, the world's second largest economy, escape the trap? Are there 
examples China can emulated? The following pages elucidate these issues. 
 
 
The “middle-income trap” is an economic twilight zone in which economies that have already 
moved out of poverty and low income by attaining middle-income status (per the World Bank 
designation, the ''middle income", refers to when a country achieves per capita gross national income 
of between US $1,000 and $12,000), cannot seem to jump to the next affluent “high-income” stage. 
An economy is deemed to be “trapped” when its growth momentum slows down and it becomes 
perpetually stuck in the middle-in- come range.1 The trap is triggered simultaneously from two 
sides. On one side, rising wages, together with weak or stagnant productivity, render the middle-
income economy uncompetitive with low-income and low-wage economies, especially in low-skill 
and labor- intensive assembly-based production. On the other side, the weak human capital base (at 
least compared to advanced economies) and limited productivity and innovation capability make 
them unable to compete with the advanced high-income and high-wage economies, especially in 
technology-intensive goods and services. 
 
Moving Up Is Hard 
 
Unlike moving from a low-income to a middle-income economy, jumping to the next stage to a high-
income country is far more difficult. This is not only because the initial advantages and endowments 
such as low-cost labor and easy technology adoption tend to disappear once these countries reach 
middle-income levels. Shifting from accumulation-driven growth into productivity-driven growth 
is difficult. A recent World Bank study (2012) reveals that despite concerted efforts, very few 
countries actually make the leap to high-income status. In fact, only 13 of the 101 countries deemed 
to be "middle- income" in 1960 had made the transition to "high-income" by 2011. The few success 
stories include South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, while the casualties of the trap are 
numerous. The ones that have languished include once fast-growing economies such as Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand, among others. According to a study by the Asian Development Bank 
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(Felipe 2012), in 2010, out of 52 middle-income countries, 38 were “lower middle-income” with per 
capita GDP between $2,000 and $7,250, and 14 were “upper middle-income” with per capita GDP 
between $7,250 and $11,750. Per the study, a lower middle-income country "has to attain an average 
growth rate of per capita income of at least 4.7 percent per annum to avoid falling into the lower 
middle-income trap," and an upper middle-income country "has to attain an average growth rate of 
per capita income of at least 3.5 percent per annum to avoid falling into the upper middle- income 
trap" (ibid.: 1). The study found that 35 out of the 52 middle-income countries were in the middle-
income trap -- specifically, 30 have been in the lower middle-income trap for over 28 years, while 
five have been in the upper middle-income trap for over 14 years (ibid.: 1). However, eight out of 
the remaining seventeen middle-income countries not in the trap in 2010 are at risk of falling into 
the trap -- three into the lower middle- income trap and five into the upper middle-income trap 
(ibid.: 1). As Figure 1 demonstrates, moving up from middle-income to high-income is difficult, with 
only a handful of countries successfully making the jump since 1960. 
 
Caught in the Trap: Malaysia and Thailand 
 
The cases of Malaysia and Thailand -- once part of Asia's high-flying "Newly Industrialized 
Countries" or "NICs" -- are illustrative of why some countries are unable to move up the value chain. 
For some three decades before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Malaysia had been among the best 
performing economies in the world, rapidly transforming itself from a backward plantation-based 
economy with a GDP per capita of around $260 into a prosperous middle-income country with an 
impressive per capita GDP of just over $8,000. Indeed, Malaysia's leaders proudly announced that 
by 2020 the country would join the ranks of the upper-income nations. However, Malaysia has not 
only struggled to recover from the 1997 crisis, its economy now seems inexorably caught in the 
middle- income trap and unable to make the leap to advanced income status. What went so terribly 
wrong? There are purely economic factors, including declines in both domestic and foreign 
investment and a shortage of human capital skills within the country to propel the economy 
forward. However, as Woo (2009) points out, Malaysia's challenges have been compounded by the 
country’s outdated affirmative action policies, which have negatively impacted economic 
investment and growth. Specifically, the New Economic Policy (NEP), introduced in 1971 to assist 
the majority native Malays, or bumiputem, by providing them preferential access via explicit quotas 
in education, business and employment, including requiring both domestic and foreign companies 
to employ at least 30 percent Malays, has not only outlived its usefulness, it has become a huge 
burden on sustained economic growth. The granting of special privileges to a particular group has 
not only spawned cronyism and rampant corruption, it has also served to underutilize the skills and 
potential of the Chinese and Indian minorities -- who respectively comprise 23.7 percent and 7.1 
percent of Malaysia's 28 million citizens. Frustrated and increasingly alienated by the government’s 
discriminatory policies, the Chinese and Indian minorities have been voting with their feet by 
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emigrating in droves. For Malaysia, this drain of both human talent and capital (as the Chinese and 
Indian minorities are among the best educated and active in the country's commerce), has had a 
deleterious impact on economic growth -- in particular private sector investment, which declined 
from 32.7 percent of GDP in 1995 to 9.3 percent in 2007 (ibid.). Woo aptly notes: 
 
By focusing too much on the redistribution of income and not enough on the generation of 
income, NEP rejects meritocracy and institutionalizes racism, thereby preventing full 
mobilization of human resources (e.g., denying top leadership positions to Chinese and 
Indians amounts to employing less than 60 percent of the national talent pool). [Having] 
ethnic quotas on ownership structure either discourages successful Chinese Malaysian 
firms from tapping the local stock market to fund expansion, or drives Chinese Malaysian 
firms to move their headquarters to foreign lands. This is why, unlike the Taiwan case, there 
are very few Malaysian firms that have moved from producing import-substituting 
(import-competing) goods to become major exporters of these goods. (2009: 1) 
 
Figure 1: The Middle-Income Trap (per capita GDP relative to the United States, log of %, 1960 vs. 
2008) 
 
Source: Concept from World Bank 2012, using data from Maddison 2010. 
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Similarly, for some two decades prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Thailand's GDP grew at 
an average annual rate of 8.5 percent. However, since the crisis, growth rate has declined to 4 
percent. Although a sharp contraction of private investment was an. immediate factor in the decline 
(as it reduced aggregate demand and incomes), the inability of Thai firms to diversify and upgrade 
their businesses and products—that is, move up the technological and productivity ladder—has 
been the real problem. While Thailand successfully moved from a low-income agrarian economy to 
an open middle-income economy specializing in export-oriented labor-intensive manufactured 
goods and services, moving to the next stage has proven difficult. Although Thailand has 
maintained prudent open-market policies with respect to international trade and foreign 
investment, has a relatively transparent and friendly business investment environment, has a good 
regulatory system, and has very good physical infrastructure in terms of roads, ports, power supply 
and telecommunications, what it lacks is the human capital base needed to move upward. Thailand 
has a largely urban workforce, whose average real incomes are significantly higher than low-income 
competitors, but its woefully ineffective and poorly-funded primary and secondary education 
system, including its universities, are not producing the skilled workers so necessary to move up to 
the next stage. 
 
China at a Crossroads 
 
According to the Asian Development Bank (2012), China, after notching an impressive average 
annual growth rate of 9.9 percent from 1980 to 2011, is now firmly a lower middle-income country, 
as it has seen its per capita gross national income skyrocket from $220 in 1980 to $4,930 in 2011.2 
Undoubtedly, the stakes for China are high as it is now at a crossroads. If China fails to make the 
transition to a high-income country, there is concern that it may become trapped not as a middle-
income country but as a lower middle-income country, with a per capita GDP hovering perennially 
around $4,500 to $5,000.3 If this were to happen, China would not only have missed the opportunity 
to become relatively rich, but also continue to suffer the indignities that plague many lower middle-
income countries: protracted low growth and political discontent.4 Hence, the key challenge facing 
China is whether it can move past the middle-income trap and become a high-income economy over 
the next few decades. 
 
What can and must China do to overcome the hurdles, and what must it assiduously avoid? What 
lessons can China learn from countries that have made the difficult transition? The following 
sections address these questions. 
 
First, the good news: China's economy has some real strengths. The country has foreign-exchange 
reserves of over $3 trillion and is burdened with only modest budget deficits. Nevertheless, Malkin 
and Spiegel (2012) predict that an economic slowdown is inevitable as China becomes an established 
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middle-income country. However, its vast geo- graphical size, and, in particular, the country's 
"uneven development" may help it escape the middle-income trap (ibid.: 1). Specifically, Malkin and 
Spiegel suggest that growth in Chinas more-developed provinces may slow to 5.5 percent by the 
end of this decade, but this decline will be compensated by a more robust 7.5 percent growth in the 
less-devel-oped provinces (ibid.). Nevertheless, they caution that China should not become com- 
placent, as the country's long-term growth projections show a downward trend.5 Their analysis 
(Figure 2) highlights both the observed and forecast growth for the two types of regions (“advanced” 
and “emerging” provinces) since 1990. Clearly，in the developed provinces, the forecast slowdown 
is rapid. This means that in a few years Chinas growth "will be concentrated primarily in the Chinese 
interior rather than in the more advanced areas near the coast”（ibid.: 4). 
 
Figure 2: Observed and Forecast Growth: Advanced and Emerging Regions of China 
 
Source: Malkin and Spiegel (2012). Used with permission.6 
 
Now the bad news: for starters, constrained external demand in the United States and other 
advanced economies has already (and will continue to) negatively impact Chinas ex- ports. Also, 
Chinas massive investments in fixed assets are already producing diminishing returns—not only 
because of over-investment and massive misallocation of resources, but also because as the marginal 
productivity of capital declines, excessive reliance on factor accumulation only produces 
diminishing returns. Chinas state-owned enterprises, which dominate the industrial and 
manufacturing sector, are not only less profitable than many of the small private sector companies, 
they are also inefficient, with a poor track record for innovation and profitability. Indeed, given the 
size of its economy, China has very few companies with international reputation. The bulk of Chinas 
high-tech exports are produced by foreign firms. Similarly, the blessings of demographic dividend), 
bestowed on China and a number of East Asian economies are a one-time boost. Like Japan before 
it, now for China the demographic window of opportunity is fast closing (Bosworth 2012). 
 
Not only is the large pool of surplus rural labor that provided the engine of Chinas export-led boom 
fast shrinking, in urban China growth in labor cost, as measured by real wage growth, has been 
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consistently exceeding growth in labor productivity since 2008 (Cai 2012; Zhuang 2012). With 
China's working-age population likely to peak in a few years (Zhuang 2012), and coupled with a 
rapidly aging population, labor cost will become even more expensive. Eichengreen et al. (2013) 
point out that economic slowdown is more likely for countries that maintain undervalued exchange 
rates (and Chinas currency manipulation and neo-mercantilist strategies have been the subject of 
much criticism), because it “provide[s] a disincentive to move up the technology ladder." 
 
How can China avoid the middle-income trap? In its ambitious 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15), 
Beijing has targeted seven strategic sectors as investment priorities. These are green energy and 
environmental protection, next generation information technology, bio- technology, advanced 
equipment manufacturing, new energy, new materials, and new- energy vehicles. If these targets 
are to be realized, there is broad consensus that China must simultaneously invest in human capital 
to upgrade worker skills to enhance productivity and innovation, and reform the institutional order 
to allow for greater individual creativity and experimentation. Although China has a good track 
record when it comes to overall student enrollment, and in recent years has increased financing for 
education, these have not effectively translated into improved educational outcomes. Like Malaysia 
and Thailand, Chinas educational system is not producing enough skilled workers needed for 
knowledge and technology-intensive sectors. To mitigate, Beijing will have to invest massively in 
its educational system at all levels to dramatically improve not only the quantity, but, more 
importantly, quality so essential to successfully compete in a high-tech and knowledge-based 
economy. Eichengreen et al. (2013) note that growth 'slowdowns are less likely in countries where 
the population has a relatively high level of secondary and tertiary education and where high-
technology products account for a relatively large share of exports." The implications are clear: 
growth in China, in particular its move from a low-cost to a high-value economy, cannot be achieved 
by simply adding more capital and labor. Rather, growth will increasingly be driven by productivity 
improvement through innovation and skills upgrading. For this to occur, investment would need 
to flow into sectors with the highest returns on capital. Of course, this also means that the financial 
sector must improve credit allocation and ensure that productive firms have access to essential 
financing. 
 
Beijing will also have to limit government intervention in the economy, especially the states 
pervasive control over the financial sector, and provide real incentives for private enterprise. 
Moreover, the authorities will have to directly confront the pervasive problem of corruption and 
establish a well-regulated and transparent institutional legal and administrative system essential for 
private enterprise to thrive. Without such changes, China will not be able to climb the technological 
ladder to the coveted high-income status. Finally, China will have to "rebalance its economy" by 
reducing its current investment and export-led growth model to one that is based on domestic 
consumption. Of course, a successful shift to domestic demand will first require a more equitable 
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income distribution. China's Gini coefficient increased from 0.3 in the early 1980s to between 0.47 
and 0.49 by mid-2000—among the highest in the world (Lardy and Borst 2013)7 Such a high level of 
inequality severely limits household consumption, and coupled with the absence of a social safety 
net, especially in health care and education, forces households to engage in discretionary savings. 
 
Some Lessons from South Korea 
 
None of these reforms will be easy to implement. However, they are not impossible, either. Here, 
the experience of South Korea provides some instructive lessons for China. In a relatively short time, 
the South Korean economy went from a per capita income level of around $2,000 in 1960 to a GDP 
per capita of $28,000 (in PPP) by 2008. South Korea's sustained investment in improving its human 
capital base, in particular the expansion of both secondary and tertiary education, has been essential 
to its successful transition from middle-income to high-income status (Eichengreen et al. 2013; 
World Bank 1993). Yet the pathologies associated with South Koreas excessively state-controlled 
economy were the key factor why the Korean economy succumbed so easily to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Specifically, "crony capitalism" rooted in the ubiquitously corrupt relationship be-
tween the country's chaebols (or large industrial conglomerates, which share similarities with 
Chinas state-owned enterprises), the banking sector and the state created systemic structural 
distortions in the economy (Sharma 2003). However, in the aftermath of the crisis of 1997, the Korean 
authorities embarked on a broad and ambitious goal to radically clean up their economy. Unlike 
their American European and Japanese counterparts, who have been only too happy to kick the 
proverbial can down the road or buy time via massive stimulus spending, the Korean authorities 
showed purpose and resolve and opted to implement painful, yet necessary, structural reforms. 
 
For example, attempts to reform the country's powerful chaebols were met with much resistance. 
Yet the authorities were able to weaken, if not break, the paternalistic (and favorable) relations these 
monopolies received from the state, including easy financing from state-owned banks. Chaebols 
which failed to measure up or were deemed beyond repair were dealt with strictly, such as in the 
case of the once all-powerful Daewoo Group, which was forced to undergo humiliating bankruptcy 
and restructuring in 1999. The dissolution of the Daewoo Group (the fourth largest chaebol in South 
Korea), was a stem warning to others that no company was "too big to fail." Such bold measures 
have helped transform the consolidated chaebols into world-class firms. Similarly, painful yet 
necessary labor market reforms were implemented to raise productivity and to make Korean exports 
more competitive internationally. 
 
Reforming the country's heavily regulated financial sector also proved challenging. Yet studiously 
following the recommendations of the 1997 ''Presidential Commission on Financial Reform," the 
Korean authorities put in place far-reaching reforms, including promptly closing a number of 
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problem banks and restructuring 12 of the 32 largest banks through mergers and recapitalization; 
increasing the existing banks' capital requirements; strengthening the viable banks' balance sheets 
by providing them much-needed liquidity in order to get them to restart lending; establishing the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in 1998 and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) in 1999 
to enhance prudential regulation; establishing the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) in 
1996 to insure bank deposits, including deposits in securities companies, insurance companies, 
merchant banks and savings banks to limit the problems arising from systemic risk; creating a 
publicly funded corporation (the Korea Asset Management Corporation, KAMCO) to purchase non-
performing loans; and enhancing the Bank of Korea's financial and regulatory powers to improve 
transparency and oversight, and reduce political influence. In addition, swift adjustments in fiscal 
and monetary policies, including prudent depreciation of the real exchange rates, helped boost 
recovery. 
 
Tackling the economy structural problems head-on (rather than engaging in quick fixes), the Korean 
economy rebounded quickly to rapid economic growth by late 1998. Indeed, Korea's experience 
shows that the middle-income trap is not destiny. To the contrary, countries which are proactive by 




1. Drawing on data in the Penn World Table (which reports per capita incomes for 189 countries 
over six decades), Eichengreen et al. (2011, 2013), define "fast growth" as 3.5 percent or higher. 
Countries that maintain per capita GDP growth of at least 3.5 percent a year on average for seven 
years are considered fast growth economies. On the ocher hand, "slow growth" means that average 
growth is at least 2 percentage points slower in the subsequent seven years compared to the previous 
seven. The authors also find slow-downs tend to bunch at particular levels of income. 
 
2. According to Woo's (2012) ''Catch-Up Index" (CUI), China became a middle-income country in 
2007-2008. It now faces "five major types of middle-income trap" vulnerabilities, including "(a) fiscal 
stress from the nonperforming loans generated by the interaction between the lending practices of 
the state banks and the innate desire by state enterprise managers to over-invest and embezzle; (b) 
the frequent use of macro-stabilization tools that hurt long-term productivity growth; (c) flaws in 
socio-political governance that ex-acerbate social tensions; (d) ineffective management of 
environmental challenges that threaten sustainable development; and (e) inept handling of 
international economic tensions that could unleash trade conflict" (ibid.). 
 
3. Indeed, Eichengreen et al. (2013) show "that a larger group of countries is at risk of a growth 
slowdown and that middle-income countries may find themselves slowing down at lower income 
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levels than implied by our earlier estimates.” 
 
4. It is not the case that countries caught in a middle-income trap will not experience any growth. 
Rather, growth will continue, but at a pace that is much lower than if these countries had graduated 
to the high-income level. 
 
5. Malkin and Spiegel's (2012) predictions are based on broad statistical analysis. They divide 
China's provinces into high- and low-income, and then, using data from a group of selected high-
growth Asian economies (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, from 1950 to 2009), conduct 
statistical analysis to predict expansion rates for both the high- and low-income provinces based on 
their current income levels. The authors note that "[o]ur results indicate that growth of the wealthier 
portion of China is likely to slow, but substantial room remains for continued growth in China’s 
interior. For example, among the advanced Chinese provinces, average growth is predicted to slow 
to 7% in the five years beginning in 2016. However, growth among Chinas emerging provinces is 
not expected to fall to that rate until sometime during the five years beginning in 2024. Thus, the 
emerging Chinese provinces are predicted to enjoy more than an additional decade of high growth 
before succumbing to the middle-income trap" (2012: 2). 
 
6. Data calculated from CEIC database and Penn World Table, Version 7.1. Image reprinted from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco FRBSF Economic Letter, October 15, 2012. The opinions 
expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
7. A common measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient varies between 0 (complete equality) and 1 
(complete inequality). In the case of China, after almost a decade of delay, Beijing finally released 
annual Gini coefficients statistics going back to 2003 (Lardy and Borst 2013). 
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